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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores two questions. First, can Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) affect 
industrial development in developing countries? Second, does it matter for developing countries 
whom they sign the PTAs with? We find that the answer to both questions is yes. Using bilateral 
manufactured goods exports data from 28 developing countries during 1978-2005, we find that 
South-South PTAs have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports. In 
contrast, no such effect is detected in the case of South-North PTAs. We confirmed the 
robustness of these findings to estimation methodology, sample selection, time period, zero trade 
flows, and multilateral trade resistance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and the share of preferential trade in 
world trade have increased significantly since the 1990s. At least 197 PTAs were formed during 
1990-2010 (accounting for 32% of world trade), exceeding the total number of PTAs signed in 
the previous 50 years (numbering 23) (Medvedev, 2010; WTO, 2011). Moreover, a growing 
number of these PTAs are signed among developing countries, reaching a total of 110 during this 
period (compared to 78 for South-North and 9 for North-North PTAs). This growing importance 
of PTAs in world trade re-ignited the academic interest on the subject. An Econlit search yields 
521 published journal articles on PTAs since 1990.
1
 Despite the diversity of research on the 
topic, however, we still do not know whether PTAs induce any changes in the structure of trade 
and production patterns across countries. Likewise, we know little about the trade effects of 
different types of PTAs, in particular, South-South and South-North PTAs, which together 
account for more than 95% of PTAs signed since 1990. In this study we extend the existing 
research in two new dimensions. First, we consider the developmental impacts of PTAs on 
developing countries and focus on the changes in manufactured goods trade, as opposed to total 
merchandise trade. Second, we explore whether the trade and development effects of PTAs 
between developing countries are any different than those between developing and developed 
countries.  
Despite the growing research on PTAs, these two questions received little attention in the 
literature. As numerous studies in development economics and the new trade theory 
convincingly show, what you export matters for long term development and growth (Myrdal, 
1956; Kaldor, 1967; Lewis, 1980; Amsden, 1987; Lall and Ghosh, 1989; Antweiler and Trefler, 
2002; An and Iyigun, 2004; Hausmann et al., 2007). However, empirical cross-country studies of 
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PTAs usually focus exclusively on aggregate trade effects without examining the changes in the 
structure of trade. The few studies that do so are typically country or region specific case studies 
(Yeats, 1998; Egoume-Bossogo and Mendis, 2002; Lee and Park, 2005). Likewise, despite the 
resurgence in research looking at the differential effects of South-South integration in trade and 
finance (Kowalski and Shepherd, 2006; World Bank, 2006; Akin and Kose, 2008; Demir and 
Dahi, 2011), this line of work is not yet extended to the case of PTAs. While the theoretical 
literature on South-South regionalism has in retrospect been pessimistic (Schiff and Winters, 
2003; Venables, 2003), new evidence emerging from various studies shows the South-South 
trade to be dynamic, and with a significant developmental potential (UNIDO, 2004; WTO, 2003; 
Kowalski and Shepherd, 2006; World Bank, 2006; Demir and Dahi, 2011). The question whether 
developing countries are developmentally better off engaging in North-South or South-South 
PTAs, however, remains an empirical one that is yet to be answered. To our knowledge, no 
cross-country empirical examination of PTAs has tackled this important question. 
We should point out that in this study we will not be exploring the question of trade 
diversion resulting from the formation of PTAs.
2
 Having said this, however, we note that that 
since the North-North, South-North and North-South trade barriers have been shown to be 
significantly lower than the ones present in South-South trade (Kowalski and Shepherd, 2006, 
also see Kee et al., 2009), it is unlikely that South-South PTAs are trade diverting from the 
North, which has retrospectively been the main point of contention among trade theorists on the 
relative costs and benefits of South-South PTAs.
3
 Moreover, consistent with Mundell (1968)’s 
assertion that “a member's gain from a free-trade area will be larger the higher are the initial 
tariffs of partner countries”, South-South trade barrier reduction is found to generate a significant 
increase in South-South exports, while no such effect is reported in the case of North-South, 
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South-North, or North-North trade (Kowalski and Shepherd, 2006). There is also some empirical 
evidence showing that South-South PTAs are no more trade diverting than other PTAs (Cernat, 
2001). Furthermore, since higher transportation costs and former colonial linkages with Northern 
countries (which always appear to be significant in Gravity models of trade)
4
, in addition to 
higher trade barriers (Kee et al, 2009), continue to limit South-South trade expansion (Kowalski 
and Shepherd, 2006), PTAs might be seen as a way of compensating for such trade barriers that 
are lower in South-North, North-South or North-North trade. 
Using the Gravity model approach to trade and employing the bilateral manufactured 
goods exports data from 28 developing countries to 241 importing countries (that account for 
more than 80% of developing country manufactured goods exports) during 1978-2005, we find 
that South-South PTAs have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports of 
developing countries. In contrast, no such effect is detected in the case of South-North PTAs. 
According to point estimates, South-South PTAs increase developing country manufactured 
good exports by 35% in one year (or, under different specifications, in the range of 13% - 61%). 
In contrast, developing countries, which have PTAs with the North either end up suffering an 
annual loss equal to 45% of their manufactured goods exports, or, depending on the 
specification, experience no significant change in their exports. We confirmed the robustness of 
our findings using a rich battery of robustness tests taking into account the sensitivity of our 
parameter estimates to the estimation methodology, sample selection, time period, zero trade 
flows, and multilateral trade resistance. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section provides a brief literature 
review of the PTAs, South-South trade, and the importance of the structure of trade. The third 
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section introduces the methodology and data. The fourth section presents the empirical results 
followed by a discussion of the robustness tests. The final section concludes.  
2. Preferential Trade Agreements, Industrial Development and Global Trade 
There has been a radical increase in the number of PTAs across countries since 1990s, with the 
South-South PTAs accounting for a majority of them. A similar trend took place with regard to 
the share of developing countries in world manufactured goods trade. Between 1978 and 2005 
the share of the South in world manufactures exports increased from 5% to 32% while that of 
South-South manufactures exports reached 16% from 2%. During this period the annual growth 
rate of real South-South manufactures exports was significantly higher than the world average 
reaching 14% as opposed to 6% for the latter.  Furthermore, as of 2005 51% of developing 
country manufactures exports were exported to other developing countries (COMTRADE).
5
  
 Nevertheless, despite the significant increase in South-South trade integration and their 
share in world trade, academic research on the determinants and desirability of PTAs remains 
divided (Bhagwati, 1998; Panagariya, 2000; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Magee, 2008). The 
trade literature long argued that PTAs can benefit member states through economies of scale and 
comparative advantage, as well as higher competition (Schiff, 2003). However, these arguments 
are generally reserved for North-North and South-North but not South-South PTAs. First, it is 
argued that similar production and trade structures in the South make it more difficult to benefit 
from economies of scale. Second, given the lower industrial development and research and 
development activities in the South, greater technology diffusion for the Southern country can be 
reaped from South-North integration (Schiff and Wang, 2008).
6
 Third, the more advanced 
members are argued to be the likely winners in South-South integration, thanks to their higher 
industrial and institutional development. As a result, lower income Southern countries might be 
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better off entering South-North PTAs. It is also claimed that industries with long term 
development potential are more likely to move to the bigger and richer members leading to 
divergence once the barriers are lowered (or removed) under South-South PTAs (Puga and 
Venables, 1997; Venables, 2003; Schiff, 2003).  
In contrast, the classical trade and development literature had a more positive view of 
South-South PTAs, focusing on their developmental benefits through infant industry 
development, economies of scale, and decoupling rather than on the static welfare gains (from 
trade creation and diversion), or the ‘stumbling block/building block” dichotomy (Meade, 1956; 
Myrdal, 1956; Lipsey, 1960; Linder et al., 1967; Lewis, 1980). Myrdal (1956), for example, 
suggested that regional integration in the South can help developing countries overcome local 
market size limitations during industrialization. Accordingly, given the strongly skill biased 
structure of output expansion in international trade (Antweiler and Trefler, 2002), increasing 
market size can help developing countries enjoy scale effects and increase the skill content of 
their exports while reducing the cost of intermediaries, which can help stimulate increasing 
export penetration into Northern markets in industrial goods (Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud, 
2006). Likewise, Lewis (1980), and more recently UNCTAD (2005) and World Bank (2008) 
also pointed out that South-South trade can reduce the growth dependence of the South on 
Northern growth, leading perhaps to decoupling from Northern business cycles.
7
 Furthermore, 
the structure of South-South trade is argued to have dynamic and long term benefits for 
developing countries due to its comparatively higher technology and human capital intensive 
factor content (Amsden, 1987; Lall and Ghosh, 1989; Demir and Dahi, 2011). Besides, similarity 
in production pattern and resource base may facilitate appropriate technology transfer (Amsden, 
1980, 1987; UNIDO, 2005; World Bank, 2006).
8
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In addition to the debate above, the effects of PTAs on the structure of trade are of 
particular importance for long term development and growth. Development economics and the 
new trade theory provide strong evidence that not all trade is equal and what you export matters 
for long term economic performance (Kaldor, 1967; An and Iyigun, 2004; Hausmann et al., 
2007). Exports in more technology intensive industries are likely to generate larger spillovers 
(such as innovation and physical and human capital accumulation) and linkages for development 
than lower technology and labor intensive ones (Hausman et al., 2007). Earlier on, this point was 
also raised by Kaldor (1967) in his three growth laws; which stated that there is a strong positive 
relationship between the growth of manufacturing output and i) the growth of GDP, ii) the 
growth of labor productivity in manufacturing (i.e. the Verdoorn’s law), and iii) the growth of 
productivity in non-manufacturing sectors. Note that the question we raise here is different than 
the one usually discussed in the literature, which is whether PTAs are trade creating or diverting. 
To the extent that PTAs enhance manufactures exports and industrial development, then we can 
start evaluating the success or failure of PTAs according to their long term developmental 
impacts rather than simply by static trade creation/diversion effects.  
 Turning to the empirical work on PTAs, the majority of research reports a significantly 
positive effect of PTAs on member trade. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) review 85 papers 
including 1,827 point estimates on the effects of PTAs and find that the mean effect is 0.59 (or 
an 80% increase in trade) while the median is 0.38 (or a 46% increase in trade). While the range 
of coefficient estimates is quite large (-9.01 - 15.41), only 312 estimates out of 1,827 reported 
negative effects. Nevertheless, despite the diversity of research, there are only few studies that 
compare heterogeneous effects of PTAs within and between developing and developed countries. 
Among the few, Medvedev (2010), using a cross sectional analysis, reports that while North-
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North PTAs are insignificant in stimulating preferential trade, North-South PTAs increase trade 
by 40% and South-South PTAs increase them by 163%.  Moreover, Kowalski and Shepherd 
(2006) argue that South-South trade barrier reduction generates a significant increase in South-
South exports, while no such effect is present in the case of North-South, South-North, or North-
North trade. At the regional level, Soloaga and Winters (2001) report heterogeneous effects of 
nine PTAs on intra-bloc trade during 1980-1996. While all Latin American PTAs are found to 
have positive and significant effects on member trade, PTAs within the EU are found to have 
significantly negative effects, and NAFTA, EFTA, and ASEAN are found with negative effects 
at changing significance levels. The empirical work on the structure of trade under PTAs has also 
been scarce. Sanguinetti et al. (2010) examine the impact of PTAs on South-South 
manufacturing production patterns in the case of MERCOSUR for the period of 1985-1998 and 
find that South-South PTAs cause a spatial regional reorganization of production along the lines 
of internal comparative advantage. Likewise, Chemsripong et al. (2009) study Thailand’s intra-
industry (IIT) trade in manufactures with its APEC trading partners during 1980-1999, and find 
that the larger the gap in economic size and income, the lower the IIT.   
We now move to the next section where we present the empirical methodology. 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In our analysis of the developmental effects of South-South and South-North PTAs, we estimate 
the following theoretically-consistent gravity model, adopted from Rose and van Wincoop 
(2001), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Rose (2004) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007):  
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Where Xijt is the (non-zero) real manufactured good exports from country i to country j at 
time t. GDPi and GDPj are the real GDPs of country i and j
9
, Dist is the (km) distance between 
the i and j, Lang is a binary dummy variable equal to 1 if i and j share a common language, and 0 
otherwise, Area is the area of country i and j (in square km.), Adj is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
i and j share a common border, and 0 otherwise,   Landl is the number of landlocked countries in 
the country pair (0, 1, 2), ComCol is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j had a common 
colonizer after 1945, CurCol is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j are in a colonial 
relationship, Colony is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j have ever had a colonial link after 
1945, ComNat is a binary variable if i and j were the same country, Dijt is a vector of time, 
country, and country pair fixed effects. Finally, PTA_Nijt and PTA_Sijt are binary variables equal 
to 1 if country i has a preferential trade agreement with a Northern or Southern country j at time 
t. ε represents the normally distributed error term capturing omitted other influences on trade.  
In equation (1) γ1 and γ2 are the key parameters of interest that we want to explore to 
determine whether South-South and South-North PTAs have different effects on manufactured 
goods trade. In the benchmark model (using a panel structured as country-pair and time) we 
estimate the gravity equation using the OLS with country-pair robust standard errors and year 
fixed effects (to control for such changes as exchange rates, world business cycle, etc.). For 
robustness, we also employed fixed effects, random effects, GMM, PPML and Tobit estimators.  
We should point out that, in addition to the research question at hand, our estimation of 
equation (1) has several distinctive features: First, Xijt here is deflated by country specific 
average manufactured goods export prices (Pit) (as a proxy for the bilateral export prices), rather 
than US consumer or producer price deflator (PUS,t), as is almost always done in the literature 
(the so called ‘bronze medal mistake’ coined by Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006).10 In addition, to 
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account for global shocks, apart from those through global inflation trends, we also include time 
fixed effects. Secondly, given the focus of our study, we have the bilateral exports from major 
developing economies as the left hand side variable. Therefore, our left hand side variable is 
consistent with the theoretical basis of the gravity equation, which explains only one-way trade 
flows between source and destination countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). This feature 
not only helps us avoid the ‘silver medal mistake’ but also allows us to have a much more 
disaggregated and larger sample, limiting the possibility of multicollinearity and aggregation bias 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Yu, 2010).
11
 Thus, this is one of the most comprehensive trade datasets 
employed in the current literature and includes bilateral manufactured goods exports from 28 
countries up to 241 countries between 1978 and 2005. 
The question on the multilateral price terms remains to be discussed. First, unlike 
previous research we directly take into account the exporting country prices via the measurement 
of the export volumes. However, because of data availability problems the importing country 
price terms are excluded in the benchmark regressions. We also do not include country-time 
dummies in the benchmark regression to control for multilateral price terms. The reason is that 
given the large number of trading partners we have, including time variant country fixed effects 
would require us to include 28 x 28 (784) plus 28 x 241 (6,748) dummy variables for it and jt (in 
addition to 5,321 country-pair dummies for ij), which would put significant pressure on our data 
and estimation.  
Nevertheless, we also undertake several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our 
findings to the exclusion of multilateral price terms. First, similar to Rose and van Wincoop 
(2001), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), and  Yu (2010), we report the benchmark results using 
country pair fixed effects, which are expected to reduce the ‘golden medal bias’ created by the 
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possible correlation between the omitted variables (such as the multilateral price terms) and the 
trade-cost terms. We should note, however, that using country pair effects results in downward 
bias in the estimated effect of PTAs on trade between two partners. Second, we split the sample 
into different time periods to provide partial control for the time variant price effects. Third, we 
try to control directly for the multilateral price effects by including effective real exchange rates 
for country i and j at time t. Last, we experiment with the Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator with a dynamic specification to account for 
possible endogeneity, reverse causality and path dependence. If all these fail, the bias created by 
the omission of multilateral trade resistance term is found to be downward, reducing the 
likelihood of finding a positive and significant estimate (Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010).  
(a) Data 
We carry out our empirical investigation using annual bilateral manufactures exports data (SITC 
5-8) from the U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) for 28 emerging 
economies for the period of 1978-2005. The sample includes 11 countries from Latin America 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Venezuela), 1 country from Europe and Central Asia (Turkey), 6 countries from the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia), and 10 countries 
from East and South East Asia (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand). In choosing these countries, the following 
factors were considered: a) the presence of a sufficiently diversified production and export 
structure, b) the availability of data, and c) regional representation to avoid sampling bias. Our 
choice of the time period analyzed is conditioned by data availability. The final dataset is a panel 
of 77,197 country-year observations from 4,908 country pairs including 28 exporters and 241 
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importers.  The 28 countries in the sample account for 82% of all developing country 
manufactures exports to the rest of the world (126-226 countries), and 76% of all South-South 
exports during 1978-2005. We also note that during this period the sample countries' share in 
global manufactures exports increased significantly, reaching 29% in 2005 from 4% in 1978.  
The export data are expressed in current US dollars and we employ country specific 
export price deflators (from WDI, IFS, and national statistical institutes) to generate real exports. 
The standard gravity variables are from CEPII, CIA’s World Factbook, and Rose (2004). The 
population and GDP data are from WDI, and, when missing, from IFS, Penn World Table (PWT 
6.3), and United Nations statistics. In our investigation the North includes all high-income 
OECD countries while the South includes all low and middle income countries according to the 
World Bank definitions. The income and regional classifications are from the World Bank. The 
data on PTAs are from WTO Regional Trade Agreement Database and Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007), and include (numbers in parenthesis): bilateral PTAs (50), PTAs with European Union 
countries (8) (we treat these as a single agreement since all EU PTAs are negotiated as a single 
body with new members automatically joining the existing PTAs), AFCOM (African Common 
Market), ANDEAN (Andean Community), APTA (Asia Pacific Trade Agreement), ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), CACM (Central American Common Market), 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EFTA (European Free Trade 
Association), Group of Three, LAIA (Latin American Integration Association), MERCOSUR 
(Southern Common Market), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), PAFTA (Pan 
Arab Free Trade Agreement), PTN (Protocol on Trade Negotiations), SAPTA (South Asian 
Preferential Trade Arrangement.
12
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Table 1 provides the basic summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions. We 
can see that PTAs are dominated by South-South PTAs even though, as the later figures show, 
South-North PTAs are also increasingly having a prominent role. Figure 1 shows the total 
number of trading partners our 28 sample countries have PTAs with. As is clear from the figure, 
the number of South-South PTAs is significantly more than South-North, even though the latter 
has increased significantly after mid-1990s. As discussed earlier, the majority of the South-South 
and South-North PTAs both in our sample and for the rest were launched in the aftermath of the 
liberalization and globalization wave of the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2 also highlights the 
significant change in trade patterns under PTAs during the 1990s. While the share of PTA trade 
(in total manufactures trade) for our sample countries was less than 5% up until 1992, it 
increased to 75% by 2005. On the other hand, while more than 99% of the PTA trade of the 
sample was with other Southern countries up until 1994, its share steadily dropped to a low of 
49% in 1999 before climbing up to 72% in 2005.      
<Insert Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2 Here > 
Table 2 shows the regional distribution of trade flows and PTAs. Accordingly, while 
observations on trade flows are proportionally distributed across different regions, this is not the 
case for PTAs. While 78% of all South-North PTAs in the sample are with European countries 
(thanks to the fact that EU negotiates PTAs as a single body), 47% of all South-South PTAs are 
with Latin American countries.  In Table 3 we also see that while inter-regional PTAs are 
important, intra-regional trade agreements account for a significant portion of South-South and 
South-North PTAs. For example, almost 50%, 77%, and 53% of all South-South PTAs in East 
Asia, Latin America and Middle East are intra-regional.  
<Insert Table 2 & 3 Here > 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 presents benchmark regression results where the default estimation is OLS with year 
fixed effects and robust standard errors (clustered by country pair) (column 2), followed by 
alternative estimations using time and country fixed effects (3), bilateral fixed effects (4), 
bilateral and time fixed effects (5), random effects (6), random effects and time fixed effects (7). 
The time fixed effects here captures not the global inflation patterns or changes in price deflators 
(since the export values are deflated by country specific export price indexes) but global shocks 
to trade. Columns (3) - (5) address any omitted time-invariant country or country-pair fixed 
effects, (including any time-invariant part of multilateral resistance term) (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003). Columns (6) and (7) present the random effects estimator, which assumes that 
unobserved country pair specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
13
 In 
column (8) we explore the potential bias created by censoring at zero trade in our estimations. 
Given the time length and the number of trading partners, we have a large number of missing and 
zero observations. The question then is how we should treat missing and zero observations? Are 
the missing observations simply mean zero trade or just missing? The common way of 
eliminating zero trade flows (i.e. truncation of the sample) and taking the log-linearization may 
create some bias in estimations, especially in the presence of heteroskedastic errors (Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). To address both issues, similar to Glick and Taylor (2010), we first input zeros 
for all missing data and use the trade levels rather than logs. Second, we employ the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator à la Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
14
 The results 
with these adjustments are reported on column (8). Table 4 also presents results for the 
traditional gravity effects (fixed effect estimates are omitted for brevity). Moreover, for 
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comparison purposes, in the first row of Table 4 we report results for the PTA effect without 
separating it into South-South and South-North PTAs.  
<Insert Table 4 Here > 
Overall, it appears that the model works quite well. The standard gravity variables all 
appear with the expected signs at significant levels, and within the range of standard coefficient 
estimates in the literature. Countries with higher incomes, common borders, official common 
language, common colonial past or linkages trade significantly more with each other.
15
 On the 
other hand, countries, which are distant, large in size, and landlocked trade less. Overall the 
model explains more than half of the variation in manufactures exports of 28 sample countries.  
The key question is once we account for the standard gravity effects, do we still observe 
any significant effect of PTAs? Surprisingly, the answer is that ‘it depends”. That is, once we 
separate PTAs into South-South and South-North, we find that the effects do indeed differ. The 
top row (PTA) (including the same set of -unreported - gravity controls) presents the familiar 
result commonly found in previous studies regarding the PTA effect on trade. Here we find 
similar results to those in the literature, a significant effect.
16
 However, once we separate them 
into South-South and South-North, the results differ significantly. In fact, in the benchmark 
regression, the effect of South-North PTAs turns negative, or become insignificant (except in 
model (4) at 10% level
17
). In contrast, the South-South PTAs are found to have an economically 
and statistically significant effect (at more than 1% level), with a coefficient estimate of 0.296 in 
the benchmark regression (2) (or in the range of 0.118-0.474 depending on specification). The 
coefficient estimates suggest that the signing of a South-South PTA increases country i’s 
manufactured good exports by 35% (e
0.296
-1) (or in the range of 13% - 61%) a year. Even the 
smallest coefficient in Table 4 (0.118) suggests that countries within South-South PTA blocks 
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trade 13% a year more than those outside. In contrast, countries, which have PTAs with the 
North either end up suffering a loss equal to 45% (e
-0.597
-1) of their manufactured goods exports 
a year, or experience no significant change in their exports ((3) – (8)). In other words, South-
North PTAs reduce developing country manufactures exports by almost half in one year.  
(a) Sensitivity analysis 
The results from benchmark regressions are very consistent and have significant policy 
implications for developing countries. In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our findings 
to time period, sample selection, and estimation methodology. First we check the sensitivity of 
our results to the time period. Compared to aggregate manufactures exports data, the bilateral 
data have disproportionally high missing observations prior to 1981. Therefore we replicated 
Table 5 for the post-1980 period when the mapping of country-pair representation is significantly 
better.
18
 The results from Table 5 confirm our initial findings. South-South PTAs continue to 
have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports while South-North PTAs 
appear either with a negative or insignificant effect. In columns (7) and (8) we repeat the 
exercise for the post 1989 and 1995 periods as well. The post 1989 period marks the date of 
economic liberalization programs (including trade and finance) in most developing countries. 
The post-1995 period marks the accession to the WTO for a large number of countries. This 
exercise can also work as a robustness test for changes in the multilateral resistance effects in the 
benchmark gravity model. After these time restrictions, we continue to find strong support to our 
benchmark findings suggesting a significantly positive South-South FTA effect and an 
insignificant or negative South-North PTA effect. We also note that the marginally significant 
yet positive effect of South-North PTAs found with country-pair and time FE model in column 
(5) of Table 4 disappeared here in column (4). Moreover, columns (7) – (8) suggest that the 
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positive effect of South-South PTAs did actually increase during the post-1989 period. 
Economically speaking, both in the post 1989 and post-1995 periods a South-South PTA almost 
doubled the manufactured goods exports of a developing country in two years.   
<Insert Table 5 Here > 
What if we force the income elasticities to unity, as suggested by theoretical research on 
gravity modeling, despite the fact that they are significantly different from unity? Columns (1) - 
(5) in Table 6 replicate Table 4 using the log of ‘real bilateral exports divided by the product of 
real GDPs’ (except for column (5) where the dependent variable is without the log) as in Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007). The results are highly supportive of our earlier findings. We then proceed 
to take directly into account the multilateral price terms using a proxy measured by annual 
average effective real exchange rates. We note, however, that, because of data limitations we 
lose 14% of the observations in this exercise.
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 Columns (6) and (7) present estimation results 
with and without enforcing the unitary income elasticity assumption. The findings are again 
supportive of earlier estimates.  
<Insert Table 6 Here > 
In the following sensitivity tests, for the sake of brevity, the results are reported only for 
the effects of PTAs, without other gravity controls. All regressions are run using the OLS with 
time fixed effects, and standard errors robust to country pair clustering. In an online appendix, 
we present all (reported and unreported) robustness tests with full results (both for the 
benchmark regression and other specifications as in Table 4).  
In Table 7 we check the sensitivity of our results to the income levels of the importing 
countries. Our definition of North already controls for all high income OECD countries. 
However, results may still differ between OECD and Non-OECD high income countries. 
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Besides, Southern countries are not a homogeneous block and South-South PTAs may have 
heterogeneous effects on developing countries at different levels of development. Table 7 repeats 
default estimates first for different cuts of the sample, and later for the entire sample using total 
PTA interactions with the income groups. The results are supportive of our earlier findings. First, 
we failed to find any robust or significant effect of a PTA signed between a developing country 
and either a high income OECD or non-OECD country.
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  In contrast, PTAs signed with middle 
income countries, in particular lower middle income, have significant trade enhancing effects.  
We continue to find similar results once we interact the total PTA dummy with different income 
groups. This time PTAs signed with low income, and lower middle income appear to have 
significant trade enhancing effects, while the opposite is true for PTAs with high income non-
OECD countries. PTAs with high income OECD again appear with a negative but insignificant 
effect. The full sample estimates suggest that PTAs signed with low income and lower middle 
income countries increase emerging country exports to these markets by 54% (e
0.434
-1) and 78% 
(e
0.575
-1) in one year.  If we merge lower and upper middle income countries (middle income) as 
in column (3), then the effect becomes 38% (e
0.323
-1).    
<Insert Table 7 Here > 
Next, we check whether the results are affected by regional differences. In Table 8, we 
report results after excluding one region at a time from the sample. The results here are again 
very similar, except with the case of exclusion of MENA, which causes South-South effect to be 
significantly higher. This is not a surprising result given that inter and intra regional PTAs of the 
MENA region are reported to be notoriously weak and ineffective (Galal and Hoekman, 2003).  
<Insert Table 8 Here > 
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Table 9 presents additional robustness tests against sample selection bias. We first 
exclude the poorest country pairs (5
th
, 10
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles) based on joint real GDP per 
capita levels. Next, we drop the smallest (5
th
, 10
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles) importing countries 
based on their real GDPs from the sample. Third, we drop the outlier observations by excluding 
those at the bottom 1
st
, 5
th
, 10
th
, and 25
th
 percentiles.
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 All results confirm our initial findings. 
Fourth, we compared the aggregate manufactured goods exports data of country i from 
COMTRADE (using sum of bilateral exports) with those from WDI. Even though the trade data 
from COMTRADE are more complete than other sources such as IMF or WB (Baranga, 2009), 
as a sensitivity check, we dropped those observations where the absolute value of percentage 
difference between these two samples was more than 20% (and called it the Database error). 
The results, as shown in the last row of Table 9, are similar to those presented earlier.  
<Insert Table 9 Here > 
We also test the sensitivity of our results to the estimation method, serial correlation 
problem, endogeneity and dynamic effects, and lagged PTA effects. Table 10 presents these 
results (using unreported full gravity controls and time fixed effects (results with alternative 
specifications are also available in an online appendix) using a robust median estimator, a Tobit 
estimator (excluding zero trading volumes across trading partners may cause omitted variable 
and selection bias as discussed in Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Helpman et al., 2007; Cipollina and 
Salvatici, 2010) (with and without censoring at the bottom 1
st
, 5
th
, 10
th
, and 25
th
 percentile of 
export levels), and the weighted least squares (using real GDPs as weights). Results are very 
similar to each other as well as to the previous estimates.  
<Insert Table 10 Here > 
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We next utilize the Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt method, which uses the GLS 
method taking into account possible autocorrelation. We also repeat this exercise using a random 
effects estimator with an AR(1) disturbance. The estimation results confirm our previous 
findings. In the following row, we check for dynamic trade effects, controlling for parameter 
endogeneity and reverse causality problems using the two-step system GMM dynamic panel data 
estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Using the system GMM 
method we aim to control for any possible parameter endogeneity, state-dependence, and 
simultaneity bias as well as to correct for the correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and country specific effects and the error term. We compute robust two-step standard errors by 
the Windmeijer finite-sample correction method.
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 Last, we check for the presence of a lagged 
PTA effect using the OLS (with time fixed effects), and Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt 
method. In both cases, results are again similar to earlier findings.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The academic research on PTAs continues apace, with special attention given to whether or not 
they have any significant impact on trade. While contributing to this line of research, we make 
several departures in this paper from the earlier literature. First, we examine developmental 
impacts of PTAs by focusing on trade in manufactures rather than total merchandise goods. We 
argue that whether or not PTAs affect the structure of trade is a more pressing question for 
developing countries than their effect on aggregate trade. Second, unlike previous studies we do 
not presume that all PTAs, independent of the development level of the signing partners, have 
homogenous effects on member trade, and therefore we separate PTAs into two groups that are 
South-South and South-North (which account for more than 95% of all PTAs since 1990). In the 
empirical analysis we utilized the standard gravity model methodology for 28 developing 
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countries (that make up 80% of developing country exports in manufactures) and 241 importing 
partners over the 1978-2005 period. We find that, first, entering into a PTA has a positive and 
significant impact on sample country export of manufactures. This finding is in line with existing 
research on the “aggregate trade effects” of PTAs. However, once we separate PTAs into South-
North and South-South, we find that only South-South PTAs have a robust, positive and 
significant impact on manufactures trade. In contrast, the trade effects of South-North PTAs are 
either insignificant or negative. The results remain robust withstanding a large variety of 
sensitivity tests. The coefficient estimates indicate that membership in South-South PTAs 
increase manufactures exports in the range of 13 – 61% a year whereas South-North PTA 
membership either does not significantly alter manufactures exports or decreases them by up to 
45%. The empirical findings also suggest that developing countries benefit most from PTAs with 
lower and middle income countries, rather than with upper middle income partners.  
We believe that our findings have significant policy implications for trade policy in 
developing countries. Thrasher and Gallagher (2008) shown that South-North PTAs severely 
restrict industrial and developmental policy space for developing countries. Arguably this may 
be the price Southern countries need to pay to have access to the Northern markets in industrial 
goods. However that argument loses its momentum if such market access is not in fact 
materializing, as our results suggest. Given that policy makers negotiating PTAs in the South 
have multiple goals in mind besides merely increasing trade volume, such as industrial 
development, production diversification and long run growth, our findings indicate that they 
might be better off entering South-South PTAs rather than South-North PTAs. Perhaps the large 
and growing number of South-South PTAs reflects an implicit (or explicit) understanding of this 
observation.  We should note, however, that there are also new questions that arise from our 
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research, which demand exploration in future studies. First, our study focuses on the case of 
emerging countries that represent more than 80% of all developing country manufactured goods 
trade. As a result, while providing lessons and guidance, our findings cannot be directly 
generalized to the experiences of other developing countries at the lower ladders of development. 
Second, it would be interesting to apply our analysis to the case of certain sub-groups of 
manufactured goods, such as those classified as low, medium and high skill, allowing us to 
further deepen our understanding of the developmental impacts of PTAs.  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 We did the search on February 2, 2012 using the PTA, regional trade agreements, or 
multilateral trade agreements as a keyword in the abstracts or titles. 
2
 For a discussion see Bhagwati et al. (1998), and Panagariya (2000). Also note that empirical 
research on the net trade effects of PTAs is inconclusive. For example, Carrere (2004) finds 
significant intra-bloc trade creation but also evidence of trade diversion. In contrast, Egoume-
Bossogo and Mendis (2002), Lee and Park (2005), and Mayda and Steinbertg (2009) report 
significant trade creation but no trade-diversion effects.  
3
 Also, Ethier (1998) argues that trade diversion is not as big a concern in the ‘new regionalism’ 
given the high level of overall multilateral liberalization, and the fact that marginal PTA 
liberalization remains rather low. 
4
 Note that this point was raised much earlier on by Myrdal (1956, 261) who argued that due to 
the colonial legacy, “governments and businesses in underdeveloped countries are conditioned 
and trained to negotiate and cooperate with their opposite partners in advanced countries but not 
with the governments and businesses in other underdeveloped countries.” 
5
 Note that South-South bank lending and FDI flows have also increased significantly. The share 
of South-South FDI in global FDI flows, for example, increased from 16% in 1995 to 37% in 
2003 (World Bank, 2006, 2008; also see Akin and Kose, 2008).   
6
 Schiff et al. (2002), and Schiff and Wang (2008), for example, find that the impact of trade 
related technology diffusion on Southern TFP is higher in South-North than South-South trade. 
7
 It is also possible that South-North PTAs can yield more benefits to Northern countries than the 
Southern ones due to asymmetries in bargaining power, negotiating capacity and retaliatory 
power. Even though these asymmetries are also present between Southern countries, the gap is 
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likely to be smaller. Thrasher and Gallagher (2008), for example, show that South-South PTAs 
leave the greatest policy space available to “deploy effective policy for long-run diversification 
and development” than South-North PTAs. 
8
 We should also note that Structuralist North-South models have long discussed how 
interactions between countries with asymmetrical economic structures, patterns of specialization, 
and development can lead to uneven development (Findlay, 1980; Darity, 1990; Dutt, 1992; and 
also see the survey articles Findlay, 1984; Dutt, 1989; and Darity and Davis, 2005). 
9
 Notice that we choose not to force the income elasticities to unity given that all previous 
research as well as our empirical results indicate that they are significantly different from one. 
However, the alternative specification is also tested in the robustness section.  
10
 In addition to the Bronze medal error, the common practice of using US CPI to deflate export 
values, or the practice of using exporting country CPI to measure export price levels are 
theoretically incorrect and can cause serious bias in estimation given the effect of changes in 
nontradable, and exported commodity prices, and their different weights in consumption baskets 
across countries. 
11
 As noted by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), however, most gravity equations are not estimated 
on uni-directional trade but on average trade, the mis-calculation of which causes the “silver 
medal mistake.” 
12
 Like Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we excluded the Global System of Trade Preferences 
(GSTP) from our PTA classification. 
13
 The Hausman test confirms the choice of fixed-effects (with a p-value at 1% level) over 
random-effects model. However, the estimates obtained by country fixed-effects “might suffer 
from the so-called incidental parameters problem, due to insufficient degrees of freedom to 
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consistently estimate the parameters of interest” (Bastos and Silva, 2010, 106). To address this 
problem, we also reported results with the random-effects estimation. 
14
 Note that the PTA coefficient estimate in Silva and Tenreyro (2006) using the PPML estimator 
is 0.38.   
15
 Except for the variables CurCol and ComNat, which appear with mixed coefficient sign and 
significance levels.  
16
 The coefficient estimates, however, are smaller than others, whose median is 0.39 (Cipollina 
and Salvatici, 2010).  The smaller coefficient estimates here might be expected given that we are 
testing the effects of PTAs on manufactured goods trade, rather than total merchandise goods. 
17
 We discuss this point more in the robustness section. 
18
 For brevity, in Table 5 we excluded the country-pair FE and Random effects models without 
year fixed effects. However, the results were very similar to those reported and are available 
from authors upon request.  
19
 The data source is WDI, IFS, and country statistics. When not available, we used the bilateral 
real exchange rates with respect to the US dollar and relative producer prices.  
20
 South Korea is classified as a high-income OECD country in 2005 by the WB, which is why 
we have South-South PTAs showing up for high income OECD group. This may also serve as a 
robustness check on the sensitivity of the results to Korea being classified as Emerging South. 
However, note that Korea was classified as ‘upper-middle income’ until 1994 and then again 
during 1998-2000 (World Bank, 2011). Besides, South Korea is a signer of the GSTP agreement. 
21
 We experimented with different thresholds (for upper/lower tails) and found similar results.   
22
 We treated lagged exports and real GDPs of trading partners as endogenous in instrument 
selection.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: PTA_Nijt and PTA_Sijt are binary variables equal to 1 if country i has a preferential trade 
agreement with a Northern or Southern country j at time t. RGDPi and RGDPj are the real GDP 
in country i and j, Dist is the distance between the i and j, Lang is a binary dummy variable equal 
to 1 if i and j share a common language, and 0 otherwise; Areap is the log products of areas of 
country i and j, Adj is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j share a common border, and 0 
otherwise,   Land locked is the number of landlocked countries (0, 1, or 2), ComCol is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if i and j had a common colonizer after 1945, CurCol is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if i and j are in a colonial relationship at time t, Colony is a binary variable equal to 1 
if i and j have ever had a colonial link after 1945, ComNat is a binary variable if i and j were the 
same country. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ln Exports 77,197 14.689 3.368 1.483 25.747 
PTA 77,197 0.105 0.307 0 1 
PTA_North 77,197 0.012 0.107 0 1 
PTA_South 77,197 0.093 0.291 0 1 
ln RGDPit 77,197 25.244 1.280 22.207 28.269 
ln RGDPjt 77,197 23.542 2.368 16.479 30.024 
ln Distance 77,197 8.796 0.782 4.107 9.892 
Adj 77,197 0.032 0.175 0 1 
Language 77,197 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Land locked 77,197 0.163 0.376 0 2 
ln Areap 77,197 24.584 3.513 9.515 32.728 
ComCol 77,197 0.100 0.300 0 1 
CurCol 77,197 0.000 0.019 0 1 
Colony 77,197 0.005 0.069 0 1 
ComNat 77,197 0.012 0.111 0 1 
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Table 2: Regional distribution of trade and PTA observations based on export destination 
 
 
 Importing Region 
 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
North 
America 
South 
Asia 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Distribution of 
Total Import 
Observations (%) 15.06 25.83 20.78 11.82 2.25 4.27 19.99 
Distribution of PTAs (%) 
South-South 16.46 10.02 47.42 14.59 0.00 9.69 1.83 
South-North 1.66 77.72 0.00 15.52 5.10 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3: Regional percentage distribution of PTA_South and PTA_North    
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table refers to the regional percentage distribution of South-South and South-North 
PTA agreements.  
 
 
 
 Importing Region 
Exporting Region 
East Asia 
& Pacific 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
South  
Asia 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North  
America 
South-South PTAs        
  East Asia & Pacific 49.86 7.98 20.37 6.77 15.02 0.00 0.00 
  Europe & Central Asia 14.74 19.65 42.20 8.38 15.03 0.00 0.00 
  Latin America & Caribbean 6.31 7.64 77.03 4.34 4.34 0.35 0.00 
  Middle East & North Africa 5.24 14.64 11.94 52.73 6.70 8.74 0.00 
   South Asia  19.57 12.86 25.91 8.70 32.97 0.00 0.00 
South-North PTAs        
  East Asia & Pacific 63.64 27.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 
  Europe & Central Asia 0.00 87.04 0.00 12.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Latin America & Caribbean 0.35 55.90 0.00 30.21 0.00 0.00 13.54 
  Middle East & North Africa 0.00 92.02 0.00 6.65 0.00 0.00 1.33 
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Table 4: Benchmark regression results 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS 
OLS and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year and 
country FE Bilateral FE 
Bilateral  
and  
year FE 
Random 
Effects 
Random Effects 
and year FE 
 
PPML and  
year FE 
PTAijt 0.173** 0.191** 0.395*** 0.091*** 0.128*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.182*** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.068) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.048) 
         
PTA_Northijt -0.657*** -0.597*** -0.009 0.043 0.110* 0.072 0.093 0.059 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.121) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.072) 
PTA_Southijt 0.286*** 0.296*** 0.474*** 0.118*** 0.138*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.265*** 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.077) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.058) 
ln RGDPit 1.487*** 1.487*** 1.870*** 2.030*** 1.852*** 1.828*** 1.595*** 1.111*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.089) (0.019) (0.038) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) 
ln RGDPjt 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.929*** 0.976*** 0.991*** 1.089*** 1.027*** 1.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.076) (0.025) (0.028) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
ln Distanceij -1.040*** -1.040*** -1.607***   -1.192*** -1.138*** -0.433*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.033)   (0.042) (0.040) (0.021) 
Adjij 1.065*** 1.059*** 0.279*   0.854*** 1.007*** 1.448*** 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.166)   (0.211) (0.202) (0.059) 
Languageij 0.672*** 0.674*** 0.766***   0.848*** 0.785*** 0.881*** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.064)   (0.088) (0.084) (0.036) 
Land lockedij -0.297*** -0.291*** -4.188***   -0.026 -0.209*** -0.545*** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.426)   (0.068) (0.066) (0.039) 
ln Areapij -0.221*** -0.222*** -0.544***   -0.250*** -0.217*** -0.233*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.113)   (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
ComColij 0.918*** 0.922*** 0.462***   1.049*** 1.036*** 0.119* 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.085)   (0.112) (0.107) (0.069) 
CurColij -1.954*** -1.956*** -0.697   -2.408 -2.209 0.498*** 
 (0.544) (0.543) (0.499)   (2.031) (1.934) (0.149) 
Colonyij 1.177*** 1.173*** 0.224   1.046** 1.257** -0.641*** 
 (0.443) (0.443) (0.344)   (0.523) (0.498) (0.089) 
ComNatij 0.298 0.288 -0.243   0.271 0.281 0.202*** 
 (0.310) (0.309) (0.298)   (0.333) (0.317) (0.069) 
Constant -31.94*** -31.96*** -27.09*** -59.55*** -55.49*** -41.05*** -35.31*** -28.845*** 
 (0.677) (0.703) (3.514) (0.442) (1.177) (0.515) (0.622) (0.755) 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-pair FE No No No Yes Yes No No No 
Country FE No No Yes No No No No No 
RMSE 2.202 2.200 1.736 1.314 1.308 1.316 1.313  
Overall R2 0.572 0.574 0.735 0.406 0.416 0.567 0.570 0.869
a 
Within R2    0.323 0.329 0.323 0.329  
Number of 
observations 
77,197 77,197 77,197 77,197 77,197 77,197 77,197 130,109 
Number of 
country pairs 
4,908 4,908 4,908 4,908 4,908 4,908 4,908 5,321 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the (natural log) of real manufactured goods exports from 
country i to j for all except the PPML (column (8)) where we use the level without logs. PTA_Nijt 
and PTA_Sijt are binary variables equal to 1 if country i has a preferential trade agreement with a 
Northern or Southern country j at time t. RGDPi and RGDPj are the real GDP in country i and j, 
Dist is the distance between the i and j, Lang is a binary dummy variable equal to 1 if i and j 
share a common language, and 0 otherwise; Areap is the log products of areas of country i and j, 
Adj is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j share a common border, and 0 otherwise,   Land 
locked is the number of landlocked countries (0, 1, or 2), ComCol is a binary variable equal to 1 
if i and j had a common colonizer after 1945, CurCol is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j are 
in a colonial relationship at time t, Colony is a binary variable equal to 1 if i and j have ever had 
a colonial link after 1945, ComNat is a binary variable if i and j were the same country. 
Coefficient estimates for fixed/time effects are not reported for brevity. Time-invariant country 
pair Gravity variables dropped due to collinearity under country-pair fixed effects model. 
a 
is the 
pseudo-R-squared.   
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Table 5: Sensitivity to time period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Post- 1980 Post-1989 Post-1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS 
OLS and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year and 
country FE 
Bilateral 
and Year 
FE 
Random 
effects and 
time FE 
PPML and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year FE 
PTA_Northijt -0.660*** -0.603*** -0.047 0.0145 0.0003 0.051 -0.511*** -0.492*** 
 (0.172) (0.175) (0.119) (0.058) (0.058) (0.072) (0.143) (0.143) 
PTA_Southijt 0.281*** 0.287*** 0.466*** 0.135*** 0.182*** 0.266*** 0.392*** 0.407*** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.078) (0.045) (0.042) (0.058) (0.095) (0.098) 
ln RGDPit 1.493*** 1.491*** 1.924*** 1.904*** 1.603*** 1.113*** 1.518*** 1.563*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.091) (0.039) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
ln RGDPjt 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.912*** 0.997*** 1.030*** 1.041*** 1.006*** 1.011*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.078) (0.029) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln Distanceij -1.049*** -1.049*** -1.605***  -1.143*** -0.433*** -1.057*** -1.070*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.033)  (0.041) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) 
Adjij 1.062*** 1.059*** 0.294*  1.005*** 1.452*** 1.014*** 0.953*** 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.164)  (0.204) (0.059) (0.179) (0.187) 
Languageij 0.680*** 0.679*** 0.768***  0.779*** 0.884*** 0.722*** 0.730*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.064)  (0.085) (0.036) (0.079) (0.080) 
Land lockedij -0.302*** -0.298*** -4.182***  -0.206*** -0.545*** -0.313*** -0.337*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.436)  (0.067) (0.039) (0.071) (0.073) 
ln Areapij -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.529***  -0.216*** -0.233*** -0.200*** -0.190*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.113)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
ComColij 0.917*** 0.924*** 0.465***  1.018*** 0.114 0.955*** 0.957*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.0858)  (0.108) (0.0696) (0.105) (0.104) 
CurColij -1.396** -1.396** -0.222  -1.631 0.540*** -1.216** -1.113* 
 (0.549) (0.548) (0.499)  (1.956) (0.149) (0.561) (0.595) 
Colonyij 1.165*** 1.166*** 0.213  1.234** -0.659*** 1.139** 1.140** 
 (0.449) (0.449) (0.344)  (0.504) (0.089) (0.455) (0.476) 
ComNatij 0.302 0.292 -0.241  0.268 0.197*** 0.412 0.519 
 (0.309) (0.309) (0.296)  (0.321) (0.069) (0.319) (0.339) 
Constant -32.18*** -32.14*** -29.12*** -57.09*** -35.73*** -28.00*** -33.36*** -34.79*** 
 (0.676) (0.700) (3.680) (1.193) (0.635) (0.753) (0.699) (0.704) 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair FE No No No Yes No No No No 
Country FE No No Yes No No No No No 
RMSE 2.196 2.193 1.727 1.291 1.296  2.160 2.154 
Overall R2 0.577 0.578 0.739 0.420 0.575 0.869a 0.599 0.612 
Within R2    0.308 0.307    
Number of 
Observations 74,116 74,116 74,116 74,116 74,116 117,529 55,238 37,319 
Number of 
country pairs 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 5,321 4875 4,767 
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Table 6: Sensitivity to unitary income elasticity assumption and multilateral price terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
OLS and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year and 
country FE 
Bilateral 
and 
year FE 
Random 
Effects and 
year FE 
PPML and 
year FE 
OLS and 
year FE 
and RER 
OLS and 
year FE 
and RER 
PTA_Northijt -0.687*** -0.0292 0.072 0.072 -1.118** -0.675*** -0.645*** 
 (0.180) (0.121) (0.058) (0.058) (0.445) (0.178) (0.176) 
PTA_Southijt 0.218** 0.478*** 0.137*** 0.169*** 0.906*** 0.277*** 0.351*** 
 (0.102) (0.077) (0.043) (0.041) (0.212) (0.107) (0.100) 
ln RGDPit       1.570*** 
       (0.0228) 
ln RGDPjt       1.021*** 
       (0.0149) 
ln RERit      0.0758 0.421*** 
      (0.0962) (0.0903) 
ln RERjt      0.338*** 0.332*** 
      (0.0529) (0.0529) 
ln Distanceij -0.910*** -1.611***  -0.988*** -0.849*** -0.873*** -1.026*** 
 (0.040) (0.033)  (0.041) (0.125) (0.0432) (0.0424) 
Adjij 1.364*** 0.279*  1.437*** 1.932*** 1.451*** 1.105*** 
 (0.192) (0.166)  (0.209) (0.157) (0.202) (0.196) 
Languageij 0.486*** 0.771***  0.612*** -0.056 0.564*** 0.777*** 
 (0.083) (0.064)  (0.087) (0.417) (0.0845) (0.0828) 
Land lockedij -0.504*** -4.216***  -0.576*** -0.547** -0.569*** -0.295*** 
 (0.072) (0.417)  (0.067) (0.225) (0.0755) (0.0711) 
ln Areapij -0.195*** -0.549***  -0.168*** -0.288*** -0.211*** -0.257*** 
 (0.009) (0.110)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.00983) (0.0101) 
ComColij 0.948*** 0.463***  1.056*** 1.219*** 0.974*** 0.920*** 
 (0.103) (0.085)  (0.110) (0.166) (0.105) (0.107) 
CurColij -0.896* -0.672  -1.042 -0.028 -0.781 -1.872*** 
 (0.513) (0.500)  (2.006) (1.125) (0.512) (0.555) 
Colonyij 1.071** 0.209  1.268** 0.771 1.127*** 1.105** 
 (0.417) (0.345)  (0.515) (1.154) (0.419) (0.457) 
ComNatij 0.226 -0.240  0.206 4.156*** 0.249 0.328 
 (0.298) (0.298)  (0.329) (0.267) (0.295) (0.312) 
Constant -21.47*** -4.090 -34.93*** -22.72*** -22.15*** -23.32*** -37.36*** 
 (0.410) (3.246) (0.043) (0.422) (0.969) (0.661) (0.904) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair FE No No Yes No No No No 
Country FE No Yes No No No No No 
RMSE 2.274 1.740 1.313 1.318  2.232 2.132 
Overall R2 0.240 0.557 0.002 0.231 -0.043
a 0.258 0.601 
Within R2   0.069 0.069    
Number of 
observations 
77,197 77,197 77,197 77,197 130,109 66,118 66,118 
Number of 
country pairs 
4,908 4,908 4,908 4,908 5,321 4,185 4,185 
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Notes: The dependent variable for columns (1) - (7) is the (natural log) of real bilateral exports 
divided by the product of real GDPs (except for column (5) where the dependent variable is 
without the log). RERit and RERjt are effective real exchange rates for country i and j at time t (an 
increase is a real appreciation).  
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Table 7: Sensitivity to income groups 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Regression results are reported only for the PTA variables using the benchmark 
regression with time fixed effects. Full estimation results are available in an online appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PTA_North PTA_South PTA PTA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Only Low Income  0.288   
  (0.224)   
Only Middle Income  0.278**   
  (0.114)   
Only Lower Middle Income  0.335**   
  (0.139)   
Only Upper Middle Income  0.0993   
  (0.185)   
Only high income OECD 0.209 -0.193   
 (0.152) (0.560)   
Only high income Non-OECD -1.744*** 0.358   
 (0.595) (0.284)   
PTA*Income Group Interactions     
PTA_Low Income   0.434* 0.430* 
   (0.222) (0.222) 
PTA_Middle Income    0.323*** 
    (0.111) 
PTA_Lower Middle Income   0.575***  
   (0.132)  
PTA_Upper Middle Income   -0.0442  
   (0.157)  
PTA_High Income Non OECD   -0.687** -0.684** 
   (0.319) (0.319) 
PTA_High Income OECD   -0.287 -0.282 
   (0.179) (0.179) 
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Table 8: Sensitivity to regional differences  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Regression results are reported only for the PTA variables using the benchmark 
regression with time fixed effects. Full estimation results are available in an online appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exclude one region at a time: PTA_North PTA_South 
No East Asia -0.554*** 0.198* 
 (0.175) (0.105) 
No Europe -0.992 0.180* 
 (0.641) (0.105) 
No Latin America -0.528*** 0.203* 
 (0.179) (0.118) 
No MENA -0.287** 0.406*** 
 (0.140) (0.108) 
Non North America -0.677*** 0.337*** 
 (0.179) (0.0956) 
No South Asia -0.563*** 0.284*** 
 (0.177) (0.101) 
No Sub-Saharan Africa -0.681*** 0.353*** 
 (0.180) (0.0993) 
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Table 9: Sample selection sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Regression results are reported only for the PTA variables using the benchmark 
regression with time fixed effects. Full estimation results are available in an online appendix. 
Fours groups of regressions are run based on: joint size of real GDP per capita, importing 
country real GDP, level of real exports, and the database error defined as the difference between 
COMTRADE and WDI databases.   
 
 
 PTA_North PTA_South 
Without Poorest Country Pairs based on joint RGDP p/c   
Without poorest 5% of joint RGDP p/c -0.632*** 0.304*** 
 (0.179) (0.0971) 
Without poorest percentile of joint RGDP p/c -0.633*** 0.310*** 
 (0.179) (0.0993) 
Without poorest quartile of joint RGDP p/c -0.584*** 0.325*** 
 (0.179) (0.107) 
Without Smallest Importing Countries based on RGDP   
Without smallest 5%  -0.598*** 0.297*** 
 (0.177) (0.0959) 
Without smallest quantile -0.609*** 0.288*** 
 (0.178) (0.0960) 
Without smallest quartile -0.691*** 0.301*** 
 (0.177) (0.0985) 
Without Outliers based on real Exports    
Without bottom 1% of real exports -0.566*** 0.275*** 
 (0.176) (0.0923) 
Without bottom 5%  -0.516*** 0.243*** 
 (0.177) (0.0891) 
Without bottom 10%  -0.495*** 0.215** 
 (0.174) (0.0865) 
Without bottom 25%  -0.504*** 0.186** 
 (0.165) (0.0814) 
Database error -0.661*** 0.211** 
 (0.167) (0.0991) 
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Table 10: Estimation method sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *Weights are based on real GDPs of country j; ** the sum of statistically significant (at 
10% or higher) PTA coefficient estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 PTA_North PTA_South 
Median regression -0.732*** 0.261*** 
 (0.085) (0.034) 
Tobit   
No censoring -0.597*** 0.296*** 
 (0.076) (0.030) 
Bottom 1% censored -0.604*** 0.295*** 
 (0.076) (0.030) 
Bottom 5% censored -0.605*** 0.294*** 
 (0.075) (0.029) 
Bottom 10% censored -0.603*** 0.294*** 
 (0.074) (0.029) 
Bottom 25% censored -0.625*** 0.271*** 
 (0.070) (0.028) 
Weighted Least Squares* -0.577*** 0.277*** 
 (0.175) (0.097) 
Controlling for AR errors   
Prais-Winsten -0.236*** 0.183*** 
 (0.089) (0.068) 
Random-effects with an AR(1) disturbance  -0.098 0.162*** 
 (0.079) (0.054) 
Dynamic specification   
System GMM -0.027 0.047*** 
 (0.056) (0.017) 
Lagged effects (1 lag)**   
OLS -0.516 0.434 
Prais-Winsten -0.249 0.199 
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Figure 1: Number of country-pairs with PTA agreements, 1978-2005   
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Notes: PTA_Total, PTA_North and PTA_South refer to the number of country sample pairs 
having PTAs in total, with North, and South. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of trade with PTA partners, and the share of South-South trade in total PTA 
trade 
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Notes:  The dashed line refers to the percentage share of exports of 28 sample countries to those 
they have PTAs with. The straight line refers to the percentage share South-South preferential 
trade of sample countries in their total preferential trade.  
 
 
 
 
